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HABEAS CORPUS-EXPEDITED
APPELLATE REVIEW OF HABEAS
CORPUS PETITIONS BROUGHT BY
DEATH-SENTENCED STATE
PRISONERS
Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Barefoot v. Estelle,1 the United States Supreme Court held that a
court of appeals could properly decide the merits of a habeas corpus
appeal 2 brought by a state prisoner sentenced to death together with an
application for a stay of execution in one proceeding.3 The Court's ap-
proval of such summary proceedings does not appear to be supported by
its precedents in the area of habeas corpus appellate procedure and
seems to be a departure from the Court's prior emphasis on special pro-
cedural protection and thorough review in death penalty cases. More-
over, important policy considerations indicate that summary
proceedings should not be used.
II. FACTS
Petitioner Thomas A. Barefoot was convicted in Bell County,
Texas, of the capital murder of a police officer and sentenced to death.
4
1 103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983).
2 As used in this Note, "habeas corpus appeal" refers to the appeal of a district court
judgment denying a writ of habeas corpus.
3 The Court also passed on the merits of the appeal involved in Barefoot. It held that a
state may constitutionally introduce psychiatric testimony regarding a convicted defendant's
potential for future dangerousness at a capital sentencing hearing. It also held that such
testimony may be given in response to hypothetical questions. See infra notes 64-65 and ac-
companying text.
4 Barefoot was sentenced to death on November 14, 1978 pursuant to Section 37.071 of
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. That section provides:
(a) Upon a finding that the defendant is guilty of a capital offense, the court shall con-
duct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant shall be sen-
tenced to death or life imprisonment. The proceeding shall be conducted in the trial
court before the trial jury as soon as practicable. In the proceeding, evidence may be
presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence. This subsection
shall not be construed to authorize the introduction of any evidence secured in violation
of the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Texas. The state and the
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Unsuccessful in his attempt to overturn his conviction,5 Barefoot filed an
application for writ of habeas corpus, 6 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 7 in
the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. 8
Barefoot based his claim to habeas corpus relief on several constitutional
grounds, including that the introduction of certain psychiatric testi-
mony at his sentencing hearing was unconstitutional. 9 Barefoot's execu-
defendant or his counsel shall be permitted to present argument for or against sentence
of death.
(b) On conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the court shall submit the follow-
ing issues to the jury:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was
committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the de-
ceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society;
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the de-
ceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.
(c) The state must prove each issue submitted beyond a reasonable doubt, and the jury
shall return a special verdict of "yes" or "no" on each issue submitted.
Tsx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071 (Vernon 1981) (relevant statutory language un-
changed from the language governing Barefoot's sentencing). Because the sentencing jury in
Barefoot's case responded affirmatively to questions (1) and (2), a death sentence was
imposed.
5 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Barefoot's conviction on March 12,
1980 and rehearing was denied April 30, 1980. Barefoot v. State, 596 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1980). Barefoot petitioned the United States Supreme Court for writ of certiorari, but
certiorari was denied. Barefoot v. Texas, 453 U.S. 913 (1981).
6 The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is guaranteed by the United States Constitu-
tion: "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
The writ of habeas corpus is a common law writ of a civil nature. 7B J. MOORE, M.
WAXNER, H. FINK, D. EPSTEIN & G. GROTHEER, JR., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 153-1
(2d ed. 1983). The purpose of the writ, according to Congress, is to secure the release of a
prisoner held in violation of the Constitution, federal laws, or treaties of the United States. See
in/ra note 7. The Supreme Court has explained the importance of the writ:
The writ of habeas corpus is a procedural device for subjecting executive, judicial, or
private restraints on liberty to judicial scrutiny. Where it is available, it assures among
other things that a prisoner may require his jailer to justify the detention under the law.
In England where it originated and in the United States, this high purpose has made the
writ both the symbol and guardian of individual liberty.
Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 58 (1968)(footnotes and citations omitted).
7 Section 2254 provides:
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain
an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to
the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1976).
8 Prior to seeking a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, Barefoot had petitioned the
Texas state courts for habeas relief. An application for writ of habeas corpus was filed in the
state court on September 29, 1981. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied the writ on
October 7, 1981. Brief for Respondent at 3, Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983) [herein-
after cited as Brief for Respondent].
9 Barefoot also argued: (1) that Section 37.071 of the Texas death penalty statute was
unconstitutional because it contained no explicit provisions regarding the jury consideration
of mitigating circumstances; and (2) that a prospective juror had been excluded in violation
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tion, which was scheduled for October 13, 1981, was stayed pending
consideration of his constitutional objections. On November 12, 1982,
the district court denied habeas relief, holding against Barefoot on all of
the claims he had raised.' 0
Although the district court denied Barefoot's petition for a writ, it
apparently had not considered his claims frivolous, and therefore it is-
sued a certificate of probable cause so that Barefoot could appeal the
district court's denial of habeas corpus relief to a federal appellate
court.' 1 Barefoot did appeal the district court's judgment, filing notice
of appeal to the Fifth Circuit on November 24, 1982.12 The district
court vacated the stay of execution on December 8, 1982. The state trial
court set January 25, 1983 as the new date of execution.
On January 14, 1983, petitioner moved the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit to stay execution pending consideration of his appeal.
The court scheduled oral argument on the motion for January 19,13 and
the parties were "afforded an unlimited opportunity to make their con-
tentions upon the underlying merits by briefs and oral argument."'
4
The next day the court of appeals issued a sixteen-page opinion denying
the stay.15
The court of appeals initially noted that, in deciding whether to
issue a stay, it should consider the likelihood that the appeal will be
successful. Using a standard it typically applied in civil cases, 16 the
Fifth Circuit said that a stay should be granted only if there is "a sub-
stantial case on the merits" supporting the petitioner's grounds for
of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), and that his attorneys did not understand
Wtherspoon. Barefoot v. Estelle, No. W-81-CA-191, slip op. at 2-3 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 1982),
atf'd, 697 F.2d 593 (5th Cir.), afd, 103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983).
10 Barefoot v. Estelle, No. W-81-CA-191, slip op. (W.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 1982), aJ'd, 697
F.2d 593 (5th Cir.), afd, 103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983).
1 According to 28 U.S.C. § 2253, a state prisoner must obtain a certificate of probable
cause before he can appeal a district court's denial of a writ of habeas corpus in the federal
courts. Such a certificate may be issued by the district judge or a circuit judge or justice. 28
U.S.C. § 2253 (1976). Congress established the requirement of a certificate of probable cause
to prevent frivolous appeals from delaying the imposition of sentences, including death
sentences. Barefoot, 103 S. Ct. at 3393-94. Although the statute is silent as to the circum-
stances under which a certificate of probable cause should issue, the certificate is generally
granted when there has been a substantial showing of a denial of a federal right. See infia note
52 and accompanying text.
12 Barefoot, 103 S. Ct. at 3390.
13 According to petitioner, the motion was filed on Friday, January 14, 1983. At approxi-
mately 3:00 p.m. on Monday, January 17, the court scheduled oral argument on the motion
for 9:00 a.m. on Wednesday, January 19. Brief for Petitioner at 25, Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S.
Ct. 3383 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioner].
14 Barefoot v. Estelle, 697 F.2d 593, 596 (5th Cir.), aftd, 103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983)
15 697 F.2d 593 (5th Cir.), afd, 103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983).
16 See Ruiz v. Estelle, 666 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1982); Ruiz v. Estelle, 650 F.2d 555 (5th Cir.
1981).
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habeas corpus relief.17 The court noted that generally a district court
issues a certificate of probable cause only if it finds that there has been a
substantial showing of the denial of a federal right.' 8 The Fifth Circuit
maintained, however, that while the issuance of a certificate should be
given "weighty consideration," it did not preclude a court of appeals
from arriving at its own determination as to whether a stay should is-
sue. 19 The Fifth Circuit viewed its position as consistent with Supreme
Court decisions such as Carafas v. LaVallee20 and Brooks v. Estelle.
2t
The Fifth Circuit then discussed the merits of the one claim Bare-
f6ot had pressed on appeal as entitling him to habeas corpus relief: that
the introduction of certain psychiatric testimony at his sentencing hear-
ing was unconstitutional. 22 The court stated, "Finding no patent sub-
stantial merit, or semblance thereof, to petitioner's constitutional
objections, we must conclude and order that that motion for stay should
be denied. '2
3
Barefoot filed an application for stay of execution with Supreme
Court Justice White, the Circuit Justice for the Fifth Circuit, who re-
ferred the matter to the Court. On January 24, 1983, the Supreme
17 697 F.2d at 595.
18 Id.
19 The court of appeals maintained that "Rule 8 [of the Federal Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure] clearly contemplates that it is the appellate court's responsibility to decide the merits of
the stay." Id. Rule 8 provides:
Application for a stay of the judgment or order of a district court pending appeal, or for
approval of a supersedeas bond, or for an order suspending, modifying, restoring or
granting an injunction during the pendency of the appeal must ordinarily be made in
the first instance in the district court. A motion for such relief may be made to the court
of appeals or to ajudge thereof, but the motion shall show that application to the district
court for the relief sought is not practicable or that the district court has denied an
application, or has failed to afford the relief which the applicant requested, with the
reasons given by the district court for its action.
FED. R. App. P. 8(a).
20 391 U.S. 234 (1968). For a discussion of Carafas, see infra notes 85-88 and accompany-
ing text.
21 103 S. Ct. 1490 (1982). In Brooks, the Supreme Court denied a stay of execution as well
as a petition for certiorari following a Fifth Circuit denial of a stay under circumstances
substantially similar to those in Barefoot. The Supreme Court quoted language from the ap-
pellate court opinion, Brooks v. Estelle, 697 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1982), indicating that no sub-
stantial question had been presented. Brooks, 103 S. Ct. at 1490-91. Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens dissented, objecting to the Fifth Circuit's denial of the stay in Brooks on
grounds similar to those expressed in the Barefoot dissent. See in/a notes 66-75 and accompa-
nying text.
The Fifth Circuit believed that the Supreme Court's denial of a stay and certiorari in
Brooks indicated the Supreme Court's approval of its procedures regarding motions for stays
of executions. See Barefoot, 697 F.2d at 596. But see in/a note 90.
22 Although the court of appeals noted that this was the only issue raised on appeal, it
addressed two other claims as well: (1) that the state had no jurisdiction to set another execu-
tion date while his present habeas appeal was still pending in the federal court system, and (2)
that there had been prosecutorial misconduct at his trial. 697 F.2d at 598-99.
23 Id. at 600.
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Court stayed the execution 24 and granted certiorari, 25 directing the par-
ties to
brief and argue the question presented by the application, namely, the
appropriate standard for granting or denying a stay of execution pending
disposition of an appeal by a federal court of appeals by a death-sentenced
federal habeas corpus petitioner, and also the issues on the appeal26 before
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
2 7
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
In a six-to-three decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision
of the district court.28 With Justice White writing for the majority, 29 the
Court held that the Fifth Circuit had not erred in refusing to stay Bare-
foot's death sentence and that the district court had not erred in denying
Barefoot habeas corpus relief.
The majority first addressed the propriety of the procedure used by
the Fifth Circuit in denying the stay. The majority indicated that if the
appellate court had denied the stay of execution without deciding the
merits of the appeal, its procedure would have been improper under the
Supreme Court's holdings in Nowakowski v. Maroney,3 Carafas v. La Val-
lee,3 1 and Garrison v. Patterson.32 Thus, the Court made it clear that if the
Fifth Circuit had not ruled on the merits of the appeal, but had simply
denied the stay because it was unlikely that Barefoot would succeed on
the merits, the appellate court's procedure would have been improper.
3 3
The majority found, however, that the Fifth Circuit had not ap-
plied a "likelihood of success on the merits" test but rather had actually
ruled on the merits in the process of denying the stay.34 To support this
24 Barefoot's execution had been scheduled for January 25, 1983. Id. at 595.
25 The Court treated the application for stay of execution as a petition for writ of certio-
rari before judgment. Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 841 (1983).
26 The Court consequently addressed only the issue of whether the introduction of certain
psychiatric testimony at Barefoot's sentencing hearing had been constitutional. See infra notes
64-65 and accompanying text.
27 103 S. Ct. at 841.
28 The court of appeals had not technically affirmed the district court decision denying
habeas corpus relief. 697 F.2d at 599-600. See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
29 Justice White was joined by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and
O'Connor. Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion. See infra note 34.
30 386 U.S. 542 (1967) (per curiam). See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
31 391 U.S. 234 (1968). See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
32 391 U.S. 464 (1968) (per curiam). See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
33 Indeed, later in its opinion, the majority indicated that the "likelihood of success on the
merits" should not play any role in the decision of whether to grant a stay. According to the
Court, a stay should issue whenever it is necessary to prevent a petitioner's execution from
mooting the appeal pending disposition. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
34 In his dissent, Justice Marshall objected to the majority's finding on this issue. See infia
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finding, the majority noted that the court of appeals had been aware of
the Court's precedents requiring a decision on the merits of an appeal
after the granting of a certificate of probable cause and had character-
ized its actions as consistent with these precedents. 35 The majority also
pointed out that the parties had addressed the merits and had been
given unlimited time to present argument. The Fifth Circuit had also
addressed the merits in its opinion and rejected Barefoot's claims.
The majority would have deemed it advisable for the Fifth Circuit
expressly to have affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief as
well as denying the stay. It found that failure to do so, however, was not
in conflict with Garrison and related cases.3 6 The majority claimed that,
though the court of appeals' decision on the stay and the merits had
been swift, it had not been cursory or inadequate.3 7 The Court thus
found that remand to the court of appeals for verification that the dis-
trict court judgment had been affirmed was unnecessary and would be
"an unwarranted exaltation of form over substance. '3
Having concluded that the Fifth Circuit had ruled on the merits,
the majority then considered whether it was proper procedure for an
appellate court to rule on the merits of a habeas corpus appeal and an
application for a stay of execution in the same proceeding.
The majority began by examining the role of federal habeas corpus
proceedings. Pointing out that direct appeal in the state court system is
the primary avenue for review of a conviction or sentence, the Court
noted that a presumption of finality and legality attaches to the convic-
tion and sentence when that process of state appellate review is con-
notes 67-68 and accompanying text. Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, apparently
agreed with this determination as well. He wrote:
I agree [with Justice Marshall] that the Court of Appeals made a serious procedural error
in this case. Nevertheless, since this Court has now reviewed the merits of petitioner's
appeal and since I agree with the ultimate conclusion that the judgment of the District
Court must be affirmed, I join the Court's judgment.
103 S. Ct. at 3400-01 (Stevens, J., concurring).
35 The majority asserted that the court of appeals had justified its action by reference to
the Supreme Court's decision in Garrison. 103 S. Ct. at 3392. The Fifth Circuit actually had
relied on Carafas, and, indeed, had found Garrison to be "inapposite." 697 F.2d at 596.
36 The majority noted that in Garrison "in an effort to determine whether the merits had
been addressed ... this Court solicited further submissions from the parties in the case." 103
S. Ct. at 3393 (quoting Garrison v. Patterson, 391 U.S. 464, 466 n.2 (1968) (per curiam)). As
Justice Marshall correctly points out, the use of this language as support for not remanding
for express affirmation is out of context. Id. at 3403 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Garriron,
the court of appeals did expressly affirm the district court's denial of habeas corpus, although
without explanation. The additional submissions were necessary because the appellate hear-
ing was unrecorded. This fact rendered a finding as to whether the court of appeals had
addressed the merits on more than aproforma basis difficult if not impossible without further
submissions.
37 But see infra note 111 and accompanying text.
38 103 S. Ct. at 3393.
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cluded. Federal habeas corpus proceedings, the Court asserted, are
therefore necessarily secondary and limited.3 9 The Court thus main-
tained that procedures adopted to facilitate the orderly consideration
and disposition of habeas corpus petitions are not legal entitlements that
a defendant has a right to pursue irrespective of the contribution these
procedures make to discovery of constitutional error.4°
The Court next discussed its previous decisions regarding the certif-
icate of probable cause, stays, and proper appellate procedure. The
Court noted4' its decision in Nowakowski v. Maroney, where it had held
that "when a district judge grants . . . a certificate [of probable cause],
the court of appeals must grant an appeal informapauperis (assuming the
requisite showing of poverty), and proceed to a disposition of the appeal
in accord with its ordinary procedure. ' '42 The majority in Barefoot
found, through reference to its later holding in Carafas v. La Vallee, 43 that,
while Nowakowski required courts of appeals to decide the merits, it did
" 'not prevent the courts of appeals from adopting appropriate sum-
mary procedures for final disposition of such cases.' ",44
The majority also discussed Garrison v. Patterson,45 where, according
39 That federal habeas corpus proceedings are considered "secondary and limited" is cer-
tainly evidenced by the numerous limitations Congress has placed on the right of prisoners to
seek habeas relief. For example, before a prisoner may seek habeas relief in the federal courts,
he must have exhausted all state remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976). Moreover, before a
prisoner can appeal a district court's denial of a writ of habeas corpus in the federal courts of
appeals, a certificate of probable cause must be issued. See supra note 11.
40 103 S. Ct. at 3391.
41 Id. at 3392.
42 Nowakowski v. Maroney, 386 U.S. 542, 543 (1967) (per curiam). In Nowakowski, the
district court had denied a state prisoner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, but had issued
a certificate of probable cause. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit thereafter denied
Nowakowski's petition to appeal informapauper's. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
vacated the court of appeals' order. Id.
43 391 U.S. 234 (1968).
44 103 S. Ct. at 3392. Although the majority attributed this language to Carafas, it does
not appear in Carafas, but is a quote from Garrison v. Patterson, 391 U.S. 464, 466 (1968) (per
curiam), restating the Carafas Court's interpretation of Nowakowski: "As we only recently
noted in Carafas v. LaVallee, . . . Nowakowski does not prevent the courts of appeals from
adopting appropriate summary procedures for final disposition of such cases." Garison, 391
U.S. at 466. For a further discussion of Carafas, see infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
45 391 U.S. 464 (1968) (per curiam). The majority quoted extensively from its Garrison
decision:
Nothing in [these cases] prevents the courts of appeals from considering the questions of
probable cause and the merits together, and nothing said there or here necessarily re-
quires full briefing [sic: and oral argument] in every instance in which a certificate is
granted. We hold only that where an appeal possesses sufficient merit to warrant a cer-
tificate, the appellant must be afforded adequate opportunity to address the merits, and
that if a summary procedure is adopted the appellant must be informed by rule or other-
wise, that his opportunity will [sic: or may] be limited.
103 S. Ct. at 3392 (footnote omitted in original, citation omitted, bracketed material in origi-
nal except as noted) (quoting Garrison v. Patterson, 391 U.S. 464, 466 (1968) (per curiam)).
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to the Barefoot majority, the Court had indicated that "there must be
ample evidence that in disposing of the appeal, the merits have been
addressed, but. . . nothing in the cases or the applicable rules prevents
a Court of Appeals from adopting summary procedures in such cases." '46
The majority concluded that, while approving the execution of a de-
fendant before his appeal is decided on the merits would be improper
under Nowakowski, Carafas, and Garrison, a practice of deciding the mer-
its of an appeal together with the application for a stay is not inconsis-
tent with those cases.
47
Although the Court determined that the Fifth Circuit's handling of
the instant appeal had been tolerable, it did not mean to suggest that
the Fifth Circuit's "course" should be accepted as the "norm" or as the
"preferred" way of conducting summary proceedings.48 The majority
outlined, in dicta, five guidelines for courts of appeals to follow should
they elect to use summary proceedings in habeas corpus appeals. 49
First, the Court pointed out that the decision to grant or withhold a
certificate of probable cause should be the primary means of separating
meritorious from frivolous appeals.50 The Court noted that Congress
had established the probable cause requirement to prevent frivolous ap-
peals from delaying the imposition of sentences, including capital
sentences.51 The Court agreed with the prevailing view "that a certifi-
cate of probable cause requires petitioner to make 'a substantial showing
of the denial of [a] federal right.' "52
Second, when a certificate is issued, the "petitioner must . . . be
afforded an opportunity to address the merits, and the court of appeals
is obligated to decide the merits of the appeal. ' 53 According to the
Court, a stay should be granted where necessary to prevent a petitioner's
execution from mooting his appeal pending disposition. 54
Third, the majority counseled that "courts should consider whether
the delay that is avoided by summary procedures warrants departing
from the normal, untruncated processes of appellate review." 55 The
The Garrison Court had continued that "[w]ithin this general framework, the promulgation of
specific procedures is a matter for the courts of appeals." 391 U.S. at 466-67.
46 103 S. Ct. at 3392. For a further discussion of Garrison, see in/a notes 89-97 and accom-
panying text.
47 103 S. Ct. at 3392.
48 Id. at 3393.
49 The Court made no effort to scrutinize the Fifth Circuit's handling of Barefoot's appeal
under these guidelines.
50 103 S. Ct. at 3394.
51 Id. at 3393-94.
52 Id. at 3394 (quoting Stewart v. Beto, 454 F.2d 268, 270 n.2 (5th Cir. 1971)).
53 103 S. Ct. at 3394.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 3395.
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Court advised circuits choosing to use summary proceedings to promul-
gate a rule "stating the manner in which such cases will be handled and
informing counsel that the merits of an appeal may be decided upon the
motion for a stay." 56 The Court noted that if an appeal is "frivolous
and entirely without merit, '57 dismissal may be appropriate even with-
out such procedures. 58 The Court also suggested other ways in which
circuit courts could expedite habeas corpus appeals. The majority indi-
cated that briefing and argument on the merits may be expedited and
that capital cases could be advanced on the docket, so that the decision
of these appeals "is not delayed by the weight of other business."' 59
Fourth, the Court distinguished between initial federal habeas
corpus petitions and successive petitions. It noted that a court properly
may dismiss some successive petitions under the rules governing habeas
corpus cases.6 0 According to the Court, where dismissal is not appropri-
ate, consideration of successive petitions nevertheless may be expedited.
The majority noted that in such cases, "[t]he granting of a stay should
reflect the presence of substantial grounds upon which relief might be
granted." 61
Finally, the Court pointed out that "[s]tays of execution are not
automatic pending the filing and consideration of a petition for a writ of
certiorari from this Court to the Court of Appeals that has denied a writ
of habeas corpus."162 The Court stated that a stay of execution should
56 Id. at 3394.
57 Id.
58 The Cpurt cautioned:
[T]he issuance of a certificate of probable cause generally should indicate that an appeal
is not legally frivolous, and that a court of appeals should be confident that petitioner's
claim is squarely foreclosed by statute, rule or authoritative court decision, or is lacking
any factual basis in the record of the case, before dismissing it as frivolous.
Id. In his dissent, Justice Marshall agreed that an appeal may be dismissed as frivolous if it
foreclosed by an "authoritative court decision," but added:
[I]n view of the frequent changes in recent years in the law governing capital cases,.
the fact that an appeal challenges a holding of this Court does not make it frivolous if a
plausible argument can be made that the decision in question has been called into ques-
tion by later developments.
Id. at 3404 n.9 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
59 Id. at 3395.
60 Id. According to Section 2254:
A second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to
allege new or different grounds for relief and if the prior determination was on the merits
or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the judge finds that the failure of the peti-
tioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ.
28 U.S.C. § 2254, Rule 9(b) (1976).
61 103 S. Ct. at 3395.
62 Id. The Court also noted that "[a]pplications for stays in death sentences are expected
to contain the information and materials necessary to make a careful assessment of the merits
of the issue and so reliably to determine whether plenary review and a stay are warranted."
1412 [Vol. 74
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first be sought from the court of appeals and that the Supreme Court
"generally places considerable weight on the decision reached by the
circuit courts . . 63
The majority then turned to a consideration of the merits of Bare-
foot's habeas appeal: namely, Barefoot's claim that "his death sentence
must be set aside because the Constitution of the United States barred
the testimony of the. . . psychiatrists who testified against him at the
punishment hearing."64 The Court rejected this claim, affirming the
judgment of the district court, which had denied habeas relief.
65
63 Id.
64 Id. At the sentencing hearing, the psychiatrists had testified, in response to hypotheti-
cal questions, that Barefoot would probably commit further acts of violence and be a continu-
ing threat to society. Id. at 3389. The Court summarized the grounds of Barefoot's objections
to this psychiatric testimony as follows:
First, it is urged that psychiatrists, individually and as a group, are incompetent to pre-
dict with an acceptable degree of reliability that a particular criminal will commit other
crimes in the future and so represent a danger to the community. Second, it is said that
in any event, psychiatrists should not be permitted to testify about future dangerousness
in response to hypothetical questions and without having examined the defendant per-
sonally. Third, it is argued that in the particular circumstances of this case, the testi-
mony of the psychiatrists was so unreliable that the sentence should be set aside.
Id. at 3395-96.
65 Id. at 3400. First, the Court rejected Barefoot's claim that psychiatrists are "incompe-
tent" to predict "dangerousness" with an acceptable degree of reliability. The Court pointed
out that in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), it had held that the likelihood that a defend-
ant would continue to commit crime may be a criterion for imposition of the death penalty.
The Barefoot majority noted that injurek seven Justices had rejected the claim that it was
impossible to predict future behavior and that predicted dangerousness could not therefore be
a consideration in imposing the death penalty. 103 S. Ct. at 3396. The Court also quoted
language in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), implicitly approving of psychiatric testi-
mony about criminal propensity. 103 S. Ct. at 3396.
Second, the Barefoot majority held that psychiatric testimony about future dangerousness
could be based on hypothetical questions, and that actual observation of the defendant by the
testifying doctor was not necessary. The Court cited Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U.S. 645 (1878),
as recognizing the admissibility of expert opinions based on hypothetical facts. 103 S. Ct. at
3399.
The Court also rejected several of petitioner's claims that related to the particular cir-
cumstances of his case. Barefoot had argued that his right to due process of law had been
violated because the psychiatrists were permitted to give opinions on the ultimate issue before
the jury; that the hypothetical questions assumed controverted facts; and that "the answers to
the questions were. so positive as to be assertions of fact and not opinion." Id. at 3400. The
Court 'noted that all of petitioner's particular objections had been rejected by the Texas
courts, the district court, and the court of appeals. Id.
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun objected to the majority's ruling on the merits of Bare-
foot's appeal. Justice Blackmun argued that psychiatrists were incapable of predicting future
dangerousness with a sufficient degree of reliability. He maintained that it is "the unanimous
conclusion of professionals . . . that psychiatric predictions of long-term future violence are
wrong more often than they are right." d. at 3408 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (footnote omit-
ted).
Justice Blackmun criticized the majority's contention that any problems regarding relia-
bility could be adequately handled through the adversary process. According to Justice
Blackmun, "expert" testimony on future dangerousness could only mislead a sentencing jury.
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B. THE DISSENT
In his dissenting opinion,66 Justice Marshall took issue with the ma-
jority's interpretation of the procedural context of Barefoot's appeal as
well as with the majority's approval of summary proceedings in capital
cases. Agreeing that once a certificate of probable cause has been
granted a petitioner must be afforded an opportunity to address the
merits, Justice Marshall found it "simply false" to claim that the Fifth
Circuit had ruled on the merits of Barefoot's appeal.67 In his view,
"What the court decided, and all that it decided, was that the likelihood
of petitioner's prevailing on the merits was insufficient to justify the de-
lay that would result from staying his execution pending the disposition
of his appeal."68
Justice Marshall contended that even what the court of appeals
had decided-the stay-had been wrongly decided. Justice Marshall
pointed out that the "likelihood of success on the merits" is not the stan-
dard to be applied when deciding whether to grant a stay in this situa-
tion. According to Justice Marshall, "[T]he courts of appeals have
consistently held that a stay of execution must be granted unless it is
The majority had maintained that professional disagreement over the reliability of such testi-
mony could be called to the attention of the jury, which could then "separate the wheat from
the chaff." .d. at 3398 n.7. Justice Blackmun did not share the majority's confidence in the
jury's ability, recalling language in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion),
that "[slince the members of the jury will have had little, if any, previous experience in sen-
tencing, they are unlikely to be skilled in dealing with the information they are given." Id. at
192 (citation omitted); see 103 S. Ct. at 3413 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Because he believed
that the introduction of such unreliable evidence has a detrimental effect on overall reliability
of capital sentencing, Justice Blackmun maintained that it is unconstitutional to introduce
such psychiatric evidence at capital sentencing hearings. Id. at 3414 & n.10.
66 Justice Brennan joined Justice Marshall's dissent. Justice Blackmun wrote a separate
dissent, objecting to the majority's ruling on the merits of the appeal. See supra note 65.
Blackmun indicated, however, that he agreed "with most of what Justice Marshall ha[d] said
in his dissenting opinion." Id. at 3406 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
67 Id. at 3402 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall maintained that the court of
appeals could not have affirmed the district court judgment, because "[n]either the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure, nor the local rules of the Fifth Circuit, nor any decision of the
Fifth Circuit, would have authorized an affirmance prior to filing of briefs on the merits." Id.
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Justice Marshall also argued that the court of
appeals could not have dismissed the petitioner's appeal as frivolous, because it simply was
not frivolous. Id. at 3402 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
68 Id. (footnote omitted). Although it is clear that the lower court did discuss the merits, it
is not clear that this discussion amounted to (or was intended to constitute) an actual decision
on the merits. It seems reasonable to conclude that this discussion was aimed only at deter-
mining the likelihood of success on appeal. In a section of the appellate court opinion enti-
tled, "The Nature of Our Decision," the Fifth Circuit explained: "That decision is a limited
one. . . .Upon the question of whether to stay execution until the appeal has been processed,
we consider the likelihood of success of that appeal." 697 F.2d at 595 (citation omitted). It
seems clear from this language that the appellate court saw its action as a limited interlocu-
tory proceeding, pending full processing of Barefoot's appeal.
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clear that the prisoner's appeal is frivolous."' 69 He further criticized the
Fifth Circuit's reliance on a standard used in ordinary civil cases, 70
where "the denial of a stay will not result in the execution of one of the
litigants before his appeal can be decided." 71 Justice Marshall noted
that, in denying a stay and reaching a summary decision, the risk of
irreversible mistake was very great. He further contended that the state
had no legitimate interest in executing a prisoner before full appellate
review had been completed.
72
Justice Marshall also attacked the Court's approval of summary
procedures and its suggestions of other ways to expedite review. He
maintained that, given the death penalty's irrevocability, capital cases
presenting substantial constitutional questions were the least appropri-
ate class of cases in which to adopt summary proceedings. Justice Mar-
shall noted that the Court has traditionally required greater procedural
safeguards in capital cases than in other cases, 73 and that in capital cases
the Court has insisted on a strong showing that the death penalty is the
appropriate punishment. 74 He expressed concern that summary pro-
ceedings would result in truncated review and hasty disposition of other-
wise meritorious appeals.
75
69 103 S. Ct. at 3401 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall cited a number of circuit
court opinions in this regard. See, e.g., Goode v. Wainwright, 670 F.2d 941, 942 (11th Cir.
1982); Shaw v. Martin, 613 F.2d 487, 492 (4th Cir. 1980) (Phillips, J.); United States ex rel.
DeVita v. McCorlde, 214 F.2d 823 (3d Cir. 1954); Fouquette v. Bernard, 198 F.2d 96, 97 (9th
Cir. 1952) (Denman, C.J.).
70 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
71 103 S. Ct. at 3402 n.8 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
72 See also infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
73 103 S. Ct. at 3404-05 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Bullington v. Missouri, 451
U.S. 430 (1981) (double jeopardy clause prohibits consideration of death penalty on retrial
where defendant previously acquitted in sentencing proceeding); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S.
625 (1980) (death sentence unconstitutional as applied in capital offense where jury was not
permitted to consider verdict of guilt of a lesser included offense); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S.
95 (1979) (per curiam) (exclusion of favorable hearsay evidence constituted violation of due
process where petitioner was denied a fair trial on issue of punishment, thus requiring vacat-
ing of death sentence); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion) (capital sen-
tencing scheme limiting range of mitigating circumstances that can be considered by the
sentencer unconstitutional); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (plurality opinion) (peti-
tioner denied due process when death sentence imposed, at least in part, on basis of informa-
tion that he had no opportunity to deny or explain); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280 (1976) (plurality opinion) (mandatory death sentence violates eighth and fourteenth
amendments).
74 103 S. Ct. at 3405 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 305 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., for the Court); Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117-18 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
75 Citing statistics provided by Amicus Curiae National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People (NAACP), Justice Marshall noted that most habeas corpus petitions are
based on substantial constitutional claims. 103 S. Ct. at 3405 nn. 10 & 11 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). The NAACP statistics indicate that most habeas corpus appeals in capital cases
are successful:
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Justice Marshall concluded his dissent by stating that, consistent
with his view that the death penalty is unconstitutional, 76 he would va-
cate Barefoot's death sentence.
IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
It is not clear that the Court's approval of summary proceedings
was, as the majority suggests, supported by Supreme Court precedents
regarding appellate review procedures in habeas corpus cases. Indeed,
the decision in Barefoot appears to be a departure from the Court's prior
emphasis on special procedural protection and thorough review in death
penalty cases. Moreover, important policy considerations suggest that
summary procedures should not be favored.
A. PRECEDENT
The Barefoot majority apparently viewed its earlier decisions in
Nowakowski v. Maroney,77 Carafas v. La Vallee ,78 and Gamrison v. Patterson ,79
as supporting the use of summary proceedings in cases where a certifi-
cate of probable cause has been obtained. It is not clear, however, that
these precedents support the use of summary proceedings in cases where
the petitioner's claims are not frivolous. The holdings in these cases in-
volved proper procedure for ostensibly nonfrivolous appeals in which a
certificate of probable cause had issued. Language in these opinions dis-
cussing the use of summary procedures appears to have been aimed not
at nonfrivolous appeals where a certificate had issued, but at appeals
that were found to be frivolous by the court of appeals, despite the
granting of the certificate of probable cause.8 0
In Nowakowski v. Maroney,81 the Court made no mention of sum-
mary proceedings. The Nowakowski Court held that in cases where a
certificate of probable cause had been issued, the circuit courts must
Since 1976 the federal courts of appeals nationally have decided 41 capital cases on the
merits. According to our records, 30 (73.2%) of these have been decided in favor of the
death-sentenced individual. In the Fifth Circuit, 27 capital cases have been decided on
the merits during this period. Of the 27, 21 (77.7%) have been decided in favor of the
death-sentenced individual.
Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. at 26-27, Barefoot
v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983) [hereinafter cited as NAACP Brief].
76 103 S. Ct. at 3406 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 231
(1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 358 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
77 386 U.S. 542 (1967) (per curiam).
78 391 U.S. 234 (1968).
79 391 U.S. 464 (1968) (per curiam).
80 For the Court's distinction between habeas appeals that are frivolous despite the issu-
ance of a certificate of probable cause and those that are not, seesupra notes 57-58 and accom-
panying text.
81 386 U.S. 542 (1967) (per curiam).
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grant the appeal and decide the merits. 82 In Nowakowski, the Court did
specifically state that the disposition of the habeas corpus appeal should
be "in accord with its ordinary procedure."8 3 The Court gave no indi-
cation, however, whether summary proceedings would be proper, as the
court of appeals there had not reviewed the appeal but had simply de-
nied the right to appeal.
84
In those cases where the Court has mentioned the use of summary
proceedings, it seems to have suggested that they could be used in cases
involving frivolous appeals. In Carafas v. LaVallee,8 5 for example, the
Second Circuit had denied petitioner's motion to proceed in foma
pauperis and dismissed his appeal, despite the district court's issuance of
a certificate of probable cause. The Supreme Court vacated the Second
Circuit's order because there was no indication in the order that the
appeal had been "duly considered on its merits as Nowakowski requires
in cases where a certificate of probable cause has been granted." 86 The
Court went on to add, in dicta, that Nowakowski did not necessarily re-
quire circuit courts to permit "full opportunity to submit briefs and ar-
gument in an appeal which, despite the issuance of the certificate of
probable cause, isfnivolous .... -87 It noted that even where an appeal
was found frivolous despite the issuance of a certificate, the court of ap-
peals was required "to demonstrate the basis for the court's summary
action" because "[a]nything less than this. . . would negate the office of
the certificate of probable cause." 8 8 It is clear, then, that language in
Carafas as to the permissibility of "summary action" foregoing "full op-
portunity to submit briefs and argument" was addressed to those habeas
appeals that the courts of appeals deemed frivolous on the merits despite
the issuance of the certificate of probable cause.
Garison v. Patterson89 is the only decision of the three cited by the
Barefoot Court to involve a stay of execution.9° There, the district court
82 Id. at 543.
83 Id.
84 One commentator at the time of Nowakowski characterized that decision as requiring
"full dress treatment by the court of appeals once the district court had issued a certificate of
probable cause." Blackmun, Allowance of In Forma Pauperir Appeals in Section 2255 and Habeas
Corpus Cases, 43 F.R.D. 343, 353 (1967). For a discussion of the facts of Nowakowski, see supra
notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
85 391 U.S. 234 (1968).
86 Id. at 242. The court of appeals in Carafas did not indicate its reasons for dismissing the
appeal. Its order provided simply: "Application for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. Ap-
plication denied. Motion to dismiss appeal granted." Id. at 241.
87 Id. at 242 (emphasis added).
88 Id.
89 391 U.S. 464 (1968) (per curiam).
90 The Court does discuss its decision in Brooks v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 1490 (1982), which
did involve a stay of execution in the context of an appeal from a denial of habeas corpus
relief. For a discussion of the facts of Brooks, see supra note 21. However, any suggestion by
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had denied habeas relief and a certificate of probable cause, but granted
a two-week stay to allow appeal. 9 1 After holding an unrecorded hearing
and staying execution, the court of appeals issued an order granting the
certificate of probable cause and, in the next sentence, affirming the dis-
trict court's denial of habeas relief.92 The Supreme Court vacated the
order, holding that the court of appeals' procedure violated Nowakow-
ski's standards, which required that the appellant be afforded adequate
opportunity to address the merits. 93 In dicta the Supreme Court men-
tioned that, as the Court had noted in Carafas, Nowakowski did not pre-
vent "the courts of appeals from adopting appropriate summary
procedures for final disposition of such cases."
'94
It is by no means clear that the Gam'on Court intended its language
to authorize summary procedures in nonfrivolous appeals. Indeed, the
context of the Court's language indicates otherwise. The Carafas "sum-
mary action" language on which the Court in Gamison had relied had
been in reference to frivolous appeals in which a certificate of probable
cause had nonetheless issued.9 5 Moreover, the Garrison Court had noted
that Nowakowski did not necessarily require "full briefing and oral argu-
ment in every instance in which a certificate is granted. '96 It therefore
seems reasonable to conclude that the Court in Garrison was limiting its
language in this regard to those appeals that were frivolous despite issu-
ance of the certificate.
9 7
the Barefoot majority that its action in Brooks could guide or control its determination in Bare-
foot seems incorrect. As Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissent, a denial of certiorari does
not have precedential value. 103 S. Ct. at 3401 n.5 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443,497 (1953); Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 181 (1947); House v. Mayo, 324
U.S. 42, 48 (1945). Similarly, Justice Marshall noted that a denial of a stay does not serve as
precedent where the Court's order does not discuss the standard that the courts of appeals
should apply in issuing stays. See 103 S. Ct. at 3401 n.5 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
91 The Tenth Circuit therefore had before it on appeal an application for stay, an applica-
tion for a certificate of probable cause, and a motion for leave to proceed informa pauperis.
391 U.S. at 465.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 466-67.
94 Id. at 466.
95 See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. Thus, the Garrison Court's reference to
"such cases" seems to clearly refer to the "frivolous cases" in which the Carafas Court had
apparently sanctioned "summary action."
96 391 U.S. at 466.
97 The Garrison Court had also indicated that Nowakowski did not prevent "the courts of
appeals from considering the questions of probable cause and the merits together. . . ." Id.
An appellate inquiry into whether probable cause exists necessarily involves the question of
whether the appeal is frivolous on the merits. This language would therefore seem to support
the contention that the Garrison language regarding summary procedures was intended to
apply to frivolous appeals only.
The Court held in Garrison that "where an appeal possesses sufficient merit to warrant a
certificate, the appellant must be afforded adequate opportunity to address the merits, and
that if a summary procedure is adopted the appellant must be informed, by rule or otherwise,
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Prior Supreme Court decisions in this area, therefore, do not clearly
support the Barefoot Court's approval of summary or expedited proceed-
ings in the appellate review of denials of habeas corpus petitions that
involve nonfrivolous claims where a certificate of probable cause has
been issued. The Court's decision in Barefoot also appears to conflict
with those Supreme Court precedents that emphasize the importance of
procedural protections and thorough review in death penalty cases. Be-
cause of the "obviously irreversible" 98 nature of the death penalty, capi-
tal defendants have traditionally been accorded greater procedural
protections than have noncapital defendants.99 Only last term in Zant v.
Stephens, 1°° the Court asserted that "although not every imperfection in
the deliberative process is sufficient, even in a capital case, to set aside a
state court judgment, the severity of the sentence mandates careful scru-
tiny in the review of any colorable claim of error."' 0 1 Because of the
"significant constitutional difference between the death penalty and
lesser punishments,"' 10 2 the Court has also recognized the "need for reli-
ability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in
a specific case."' 10 3
The majority's stance in Barefoot seems inconsistent with the Court's
previous emphasis on greater protections and careful review in the area
of the death penalty. Indeed, the Court's position appears to relegate
the death-sentenced state prisoner with a nonfrivolous, "colorable claim
of error" and a certificate of probable cause in hand to a procedurally
and substantively less thorough appeal than that available to the vast
that his opportunity will or may be limited." Id. This language is not, however, inconsistent
with a conclusion that the Garrison Court contemplated application of such "summary proce-
dure" to purely frivolous claims where a certificate of probable cause had nonetheless issued.
It is also important to note that in Garrison the court of appeals had stayed petitioner's
execution pending its consideration of his motion for leave to appeal informa pauperi and
application for certificate of probable cause. Id. at 465. Thus, none of these cases had specifi-
cally held that the merits could be addressed on application for stay of execution. Garrion
had only addressed the practice of deciding the questions of probable cause and the merits
together.
98 Evans v. Bennett, 440 U.S. 1301, 1306 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., as Circuit Justice).
99 For a review of a number of such holdings, see supra note 73.
10 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983). The Court in Zant upheld a death sentence where the jury had
found three statutory aggravating circumstances to exist, even though one of the circum-
stances was later found to be unconstitutionally vague.
101 Id. at 2747. Justice Marshall has similarly noted that "[b]ecause of the unique finality
of the death penalty, its imposition must be the result of careful procedures and must survive
close scrutiny on post-trial review." Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 955 (1981) (denial of
certiorari) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
102 Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1980).
103 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion). Indeed, last
term the Court in Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983), characterized this need for relia-
bility as a major "them[e] . . .reiterated in . . .[its] opinions discussing the procedures re-
quired by the Constitution in capital sentencing determinations." Id. at 2746-47.
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majority of other criminal defendants. The Court apparently assumes
that a thorough review is still possible in summary proceedings. How-
ever, such proceedings are by their nature meant to entail quick review.
It seems clear, therefore, that such new procedural routes can only re-
duce the likelihood of appellate courts engaging in the kind of "careful
scrutiny" insisted upon by the Supreme Court in its previous
decisions.104
In light of the Court's precedents emphasizing the importance of
procedural protections and thorough review in death penalty cases, the
Court's decision in Barefoot might be explained by the Court's general
hostility to federal habeas corpus review of state court judgments. Re-
cently, the Court has restricted the scope of federal habeas review in
several ways.'0 5 The Barefoot decision may well be premised, then, on
the Court's initial discussion of the "secondary and limited" role of fed-
eral habeas corpus review.'06 The decision in Barefoot may also be at-
tributed to the Court's recognition that "an increasing number of death-
sentenced petitioners are entering the appellate stages of the federal
habeas process."'
10 7
104 See in/a notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
105 See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 102 S. Ct. 1198 (1982) (federal district courts must dismiss a
state prisoner's habeas corpus petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims);
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (failure of petitioner to make timely objection under
state contemporaneous-objection rule to admission of inculpatory statements, absent showing
of cause for noncompliance and some showing of actual prejudice, bars federal habeas corpus
review of Miranda claim); see also in/a note 106.
106 103 S. Ct. at 3391. Such a restrictive view of the scope of federal habeas corpus review
of state court judgments is not new. Commentators have noted the Court's growing hostility
to federal habeas review. See, e.g., Reynolds, Sumner v. Mata: Twilight's Last Gleaming for
Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Court Convictions? Speculations on the Future of the Great Wrt,
4 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK LJ. 289, 302-03 (1981) ("In the final analysis, one conclusion seems
inescapable: from the petitioner's perspective, the Court's demonstrated hostility toward the
writ of habeas corpus portends nothing good for the future."); Comment, Lundy, Isaac and
Frady: A Trilogy of Habeas Corpus Restraint, 32 CATH. U.L. REv. 169, 219 (1982) ("In curbing
the scope of federal habeas corpus review, the Court has come perilously close to disregarding,
if not reinterpreting, the habeas corpus statutes.").
Members of the Supreme Court and Congress have proposed procedural curtailments on
habeas corpus review, see, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 102 S. Ct. 1198 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72 (1977), and broad limitations on the consideration of certain constitutional
claims. For a critical evaluation of a number of proposals, see Olsen,Judicial Proposals to Limit
the Jurisdictional Scope of Federal Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Consideration of the Claims of State
Prisoners, 31 BUFFALO L. REv. 301 (1982).
107 103 S. Ct. at 3393. Statistics indicate that since the death penalty was held constitu-
tional in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), the courts of appeals have decided 41 habeas
corpus cases brought by prisoners sentenced to death. Approximately 60 more are pending.
NAACP Brief, supra note 75, at 20. Moreover, roughly 100 cases are pending in the federal
district courts. Id. at 35.
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B. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Two important policy considerations indicate that summary pro-
ceedings should not be used. First, summary proceedings pose a risk
that death row prisoners seeking habeas relief will receive inadequate
legal representation. Capital inmates are often represented by unpaid,
volunteer, solo practitioners. 0 8 Summary proceedings, which necessarily
entail expedited schedules, "will place an enormous financial burden on
these attorneys-for the rapid reproduction of documents, for overnight
delivery services, for trips to hastily convened oral arguments-and may
disrupt for weeks at a time the attorneys' other practice." 0 9 Thus, these
attorneys may be unable to provide the kind of representation they have
in the past. In addition, "a disturbingly large number of death row pris-
oners are not represented on federal habeas corpus by attorneys with
specialized competence in capital litigation. Indeed, many are now rep-
resented by criminal law practitioners with minimal past exposure to
constitutional law, appellate practice and the federal courts."" 0 Such
attorneys simply may not have time to acquaint themselves with the
relevant law if they are held to the expedited schedules involved in sum-
mary proceedings.
Second, summary proceedings create a real potential for less than
adequate judicial review."' Appellate courts have recognized that, in
108 Brief of Amicus Curiae American Bar Association at 21, Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct.
3383 (1983).
109 Id.
110 NAACP Brief, supra note 75, at 31.
111 Barefoot's appeal seems to support this conclusion. The Fifth Circuit established an
extremely short schedule for briefing and argument. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying
text. The time between the initial application for stay of execution and the court of appeals'
decision spanned only five working days. Nevertheless, the issues presented had been adjudg-
ed sufficiently meritorious by the district court to warrant issuance of a certificate of probable
cause. They were also issues of first impression. Application for Stay of Execution in the
Supreme Court at 2, Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Applica-
tion for Stay of Execution]. The reliability of psychiatric testimony regarding future danger-
ousness was a legal issue over which courts had disagreed, see, e.g., White v. Estelle, 554 F.
Supp. 851 (S.D. Tex. 1982), aj'd, 720 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1983); People v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal.
3d 733, 631 P.2d 446, 175 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922 (1983), and which
the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas had characterized as "the subject of widespread
debate." Barefoot v. State, 596 S.W.2d 875, 887 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S.
913 (1981).
Although the court of appeals said that it had "studied the briefs and record," Barefoot
v. Estelle, 697 F.2d at 595, it is worth noting the conditions under which this study occurred.
The transcript of petitioner's habeas corpus hearing in the district court involved approxi-
mately 260 pages of text, while the record of petitioner's state court trial and sentencing
hearing involved approximately 1400 pages. Application for Stay of Execution, supra, at 4-5.
None of the three panelists on the circuit court saw these records until the day before the
court issued its 16-page opinion. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 26. Yet, at least one of
the issues that the court of appeals handled involved an analysis of the impact certain alleg-
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practice, the time constraints on a motion for stay of execution simply
preclude any "fine-tuned inquiry" into the merits of an appeal."1
2
Members of the Supreme Court' 13 and commentators 14 have cautioned
against the expedition of appellate review of death penalty cases on the
ground that it might result in inadequate review.
Of course, the states and the federal government have certain inter-
ests in the expedition of federal habeas corpus review. The states cer-
tainly have an interest in minimizing any delay in the carrying out of
their sentences," 15 and the federal government has an interest in reduc-
edly improper evidence may have had on the determination of Barefoot's guilt. See supra note
22.
112 See Shaw v. Martin, 613 F.2d 487, 492 (4th Cir. 1980) ("In the very nature of proceed-
ings on a motion for a stay of execution, the limited record coupled with the time constraints
imposed by imminence of execution preclude any fine-tuned inquiry into the actual merits.");
see also Dobbert v. Strickland, 670 F.2d 938, 940 (11 th Cir. 1982) ("Because the brief period of
time between the filing of this appeal and the scheduled execution is insufficient to consider
properly the merits of the issues raised, this Court must stay the execution of the death
sentence.").
113 Justice Stevens has noted:
This Court should endeavor to conclude capital cases-like all other litigation--as
promptly as possible. We must, however, also be as sure as possible that novel procedural
shortcuts have not permitted error of a constitutional magnitude to occur. For after all,
death cases are indeed different in kind from all other litigation. The penalty, once
imposed, is irrevocable.
Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 953 (1981) (denial of certiorari) (Stevens, J., concurring).
In Coleman, Justice Stevens, in concurring in the denial of certiorari in a capital habeas ap-
peal, criticized Justice Rehnquist's proposal to, in Justice Stevens' words, "grant certiorari
and decide the merits of every capital case coming from the state courts in order to expedite
the administration of the death penalty." Id. at 949 (Stevens, J., concurring).
114 See Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908, 922 (1982) ("the
number of capitally sentenced defendants who have been found innocent argues powerfully
against adopting limitations that would have allowed them to be executed. The much larger
number who have been found illegally or unfairly convicted or sentenced argues with similar
force.').
115 As the Respondent in Barefoot explained:
[T]he states suffer irreparable injury by the passing of every day that its constitutionally
obtained death sentences are not carried out. The unconscionable delays attendant to
death penalty litigation in this country frustrate society's mandate; promote the public
perception that the law cannot be carried out; destroy whatever deterrent effect the im-
position of the death penalty might otherwise have; and unfairly penalize prisoners with
unconstitutional convictions who remain on death row for interminable lengths of time.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 8, at 24.
Justice Rehnquist has frequently focused on this state interest. In Evans v. Bennett, 440
U.S. 1301 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., as Circuit Justice), he explained:
[flust as the rule of law entitles a criminal defendant to be surrounded with all the
protections which do surround him under our system prior to conviction and during trial
and appellate review, the other side of that coin is that when the State has taken all the
steps required by that rule of law, its will, as represented by the legislature which author-
ized the imposition of the death sentence, and the state courts which imposed and up-
held it, should be carried out.
Id. at 1303; see also Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 959 (1981) (denial of certiorari)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[w]hen society promises to punish by death certain criminal con-
duct, and then the courts fail to do so, the courts not only lessen the deterrent effect of the
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ing the expense of valuable court time and judicial resources. 116 Habeas
corpus cases admittedly often involve issues that have been thoroughly
briefed several times before several courts in two judicial systems.
117
Nevertheless, these interests do not outweigh the interests in ade-
quate representation and review in death penalty cases. That an execu-
tion will be delayed for a few additional months hardly seems to
warrant the adoption of summary proceedings that are likely to lead to
inadequate appellate review."18 A significant period of incarceration on
death row is inevitable whether federal habeas review is expedited or
not."19 Moreover, the purpose of this "well-established" avenue of re-
view 120 is the detection of constitutional error in clearly nonfrivolous
cases where a certificate of probable cause has issued. A justification of
summary proceedings based on claims of delay and judicial expense sim-
ply ignores the fact that such appeals raise legitimate, and often merito-
rious, claims for relief.
12'
V. CONCLUSION
The Court in Barefoot v. Estelle relies on its earlier decisions in the
area of habeas appellate procedure in holding that summary proceed-
ings may be used in review of habeas corpus appeals brought by state
prisoners sentenced to death. It is not clear, however, that those deci-
threat of capital punishment, they undermine the integrity of the entire criminal justice sys-
tem"); cf. Brief of Amicus Curiae State of Florida at 1, Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383
(1983) (arguing that requests for last minute stays of scheduled executions plague the state's
efforts to carry out its law and that a state has a legitimate interest in the finality of its courts'
judgments).
116 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 260-61 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
For a discussion of the drain ofjudicial docket time resulting from habeas corpus filings in the
federal district courts, see Bagwell, Procedural Aspects of Prisoner § 1983 and § 2254 Cases in the
Fjfh and Eleventh Circuits, 95 F.R.D. 435, 437 (1982).
117 Justice Powell explained:
When raised on federal habeas, a claim generally has been considered by two or more
tiers of state courts. It is the solemn duty of these courts, no less than federal ones, to
safeguard personal liberties and consider federal claims in accord with federal law. The
task which federal courts are asked to perform on habeas is thus most often one that has
or should have been done before. The presumption that "if ajob can be well done once,
it should not be done twice" is sound and one calculated to utilize best "the intellectual,
moral, and political resources involved in the legal system."
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 259 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote
omitted).
118 Stee supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
119 Justice Stevens has noted that, given bifurcated punishment hearings, post-trial pro-
ceedings in the trial court, direct and collateral review in the state judicial system, collateral
federal review, and clemency review, "it seems inevitable that there must be a significant
period of incarceration on death row during the interval between sentencing and execution."
Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 952 (1981) (denial of certiorari) (Stevens, J., concurring).
120 Shaw v. Martin, 613 F.2d 487, 491 (4th Cir. 1980).
121 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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sions actually support the Court's holding. Moreover, the Court's deci-
sion seems to conflict with its precedents that emphasize the importance
of procedural protections and thorough review in death penalty cases.
The impact of the Barefoot decision depends largely on the courts of
appeals. The Court indicated that the decision to use summary pro-
ceedings lies with the circuit courts. 122 Given the recent decisions of
other circuits, it seems unlikely that the circuit courts will quickly join
the Fifth Circuit and use summary proceedings. 123 Important policy
considerations certainly indicate that courts of appeals should not use
such proceedings. Any interests the states may have in expediting the
appellate review of habeas corpus petitions brought by state prisoners
sentenced to death seem outweighed by the consequences that may fol-
low from the use of summary proceedings: namely, inadequate legal rep-
resentation and judicial review.
TIMOTHY A. ITA
122 See 103 S. Ct. at 3393.
123 Language in recent decisions of the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, for instance, has
emphasized the problems involved in deciding the merits of an appeal in the short time pre-
ceding executions. See supra note 112. Furthermore, Amicus Curiae NAACP noted that since
1976 every circuit court other than the Fifth has granted a stay of execution in every capital
case to come before it. NAACP Brief, supra note 75, at 2d.
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